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Jürgen Miethke
“Freiheit _ ein schönes Wort " wer’s recht verstände! 
(Freedom, a nice word _ if there is anyone who understands its 
meaning correctly)”. Johann Woltgang von Goethe, one of the 
greatest German authors, formulated this remark in his tragedy 
‘Egmont’, written from 1775 to 1787. Here Goethe presented to 
the public a ‘great man’ of the sixteenth century, reflecting the 
uprising of the Netherlands against the Spanish king for the 
sake of freedom and liberty. Before and after Goethe many 
people have written many pages on the semantics of freedom 
and liberty.* 1) But still today, when we speak of freedom, we
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1) An overview is given e.g. in: Christian Meier, Jochen Bleicken, Werner
Conze, Gerhard May, Christof Dipper, Horst Günther, Diethelm Klippel,
Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen 
Sprache in Deutschland, eds. Otto Brunner, Werner Conze, Reinhart
Koselleck, vol. 2(Stuttgart 1975), pp. 425-542: cf. W. Warnmach, Hermann
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often don’t know exactly what we mean by this concept. I 
cannot claim to sharpen with my considerations how we 
understand freedom in our present time. But I want to give 
some examples of thoughts on political freedom in later 
medieval scholasticism by taking some examples for our review. 
With this, we shall be able to have an impression ot the 
prehistory ot freedom as a political concept immediately at and 
before the beginnings of modernity. This may help us to have a 
better look at the complexity of the phenomenon even today.
A proper ‘political science’ as a scientific discipline with 
specific methods and a certain bundle of questions, all of which 
were very distinct from other disciplines, did not exist at the 
‘scholastic’ universities in late medieval Europe. An independent 
discipline of its own was invented only with the beginning of 
modern times, i.e. in the 16th century. The name of the 
theorist who is normally considered to be the inventor of an 
independent political science is Niccolo Machiavelli (who died
Otto Pesch, Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, ed. von Joachim 
Ritter, vol. 2(Basel 1972), pp. 1064-1098: for the middle ages shortly: Claus 
Schott, Hermann Otto Pesch, Lexikon des Mittelalters, vol. 4 (München/ 
Zürich 1989), pp. 896-901. The main literature: Herbert Grundmann, 
“Freiheit als religiöses, politisches und persönliches Postulat im Mittelalter”, 
Historische Zeitschrift 183(1957) pp. 23-53: Wilhelm Berges, 
“Selbstbestimmung in der Geschichte”, Freiheit als Problem der 
Wissenschaftpfreie Universität Berlin, Abendvorträge im Winter 1961/62), 
(Berlin 1963), pp. 147-160: Johannes Fried, “Über den Universalismus der 
Freiheit im Mittelalter”, Historische Zeitschrift 240(1985), pp. 313-361: as 
well as the anthology: Die abendländische Freiheit vom 10. zum 14. 
Jahrhundert, Der Wirkungszusammenhang von Idee und Wirklichkeit im 
europäischen Vergleich, ed. von Johannes Fried(Vorträge und Forschungen, 
39)(Sigmaringen 1991).
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1527). It is his name which is always on the tongue ot all 
historians dealing with this question, and with Machiavelli we 
get far away from scholasticism and medieval universities to 
Renaissance Florence and the politics of modernity.
This is the key difference from our contemporary universities 
all over the world. The different scholastic faculties were 
distinct from each other mainly by their basic textbooks and 
their concomitant traditions, not by methods of thinking or 
procedures of research. The theologians had on their side the 
Holy Bible and the church fathers, the jurists, the Corpus Iuris 
civilis or the Corpus Iuris canonici, the physicians used Arabic 
and ancient Greek medical texts in Latin translations, and the 
members of the Arts Faculty looked more towards Aristotle and 
the Corpus of his writings in addition to the elder Roman texts 
of Cicero. But all the men who studied at one of these different 
faculties could be addressed with questions by rulers and 
practical politicians about how to answer a specific political 
question, how to argue for a special practical solution, how to 
plan to legitimize a certain deed. All of these university-trained 
men had a strong tendency to seek an answer that was rooted 
in their own respective traditions, i.e. within their own scientific 
discipline. Today you can still see whether a certain political 
treatise was written by a theologian, a lawyer or an artist (i.e. a 
member of a philosophical faculty) even if the answers in a 
practical respect were not too far away from each other.
It seems to me adequate, therefore, to call all the four main 
faculties of the scholastic university a sort of ‘leading sciences’ for
the political theory ot the later Middle Ages. It is similar to the 
concept ot the ditterent ‘languages’ ot the medieval political 
theories, as they were called by the Cambridge school ot political 
science, especially by Quentin Skinner and his students, giving an 
explanation for the unity in content and the differences in 
construction in political theories of the later Middle Ages. But I 
prefer this metaphor of ‘leading science’ to the broader Cambridge 
metaphor of ‘language’, because a ‘theory’ seems to me only in a 
very restricted sense comparable to a ‘language’.
Today it is easy to realize which faculty had hosted the 
author of a special political treatise. Rather, political theories 
did belong to the context of the efforts of medieval 
scholasticism. They belonged to those efforts, which may be 
called the practical ‘output’ of scholastic science, i.e. the 
practical consequences of medieval scientific thought. Today we 
can easily see the faculty or faculties which have formed an 
author of political tracts. For instance, Marsilius of Padua had 
been a Master of Arts and a student of medicine and theology 
at the University of Paris, and you may detect easily these origins 
and qualifications in the very text of his Defensor pacis. The same 
applies, mutatis mutandis, with all other authors, as we can see 
with Thomas Aquinas or William of Ockham, who were theologians, 
with Bartolus of Sassoferrato, Nicolaus Tedeschi or Lupold of 
Bebgenburg, who were lawyers, and so on through the whole 
series of late medieval political theorists.
If we try to explain the difference between the faculties and 
their function as leading sciences of political theory on the one
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side and the unity which they show in their guidelines for 
practical politics, an answer may already be the simple hint at 
a slow and steady ditterentiation ot the subject ‘politics’, which 
took place during a lengthy process that could not be 
accomplished in a period ot one or two generations. But with 
this answer we stay only at the surface of the phenomenon, as 
we don’t get any information about the conditions of the 
political thought of scholasticism, with the secret goal of a 
‘political theory’ in the modern sense of the word.
I want to emphasize that the medieval scholars, whether at 
the University or after having completed their university 
education, wanted to respond to the problems of their 
contemporary world based on their experience with their texts 
and treatises and the thoughts they had learned during their 
long and complicated university education. They all wanted to 
use what they had learned in their studies. The medieval world, 
the rulers and practicians, wanted to use the scientific experts 
generally, wherever they could reach them, because this was a 
sort of legitimation by traditional and reasonable insights into 
social structures, which was offered to them by the treasure of 
the old texts. In the Middle ages, political theory tried to give 
answers to a perceived urgency of the contemporary situation 
and its requests, and that means they did not answer only or 
not primarily to their scientific environment. They were trying 
to respond to the search for scientific guidance in everyday 
problems. They tried in an eminent sense to give a practical 
application of scientific theory to everyday life in their own
time.
This means for our own interpretation of medieval 
discussions that we meet here again the deep unity of the 
medieval understanding of the world which shaped the results 
also of the theoretical discussions of politics beyond all the 
differences in the individual and yet so significant discrepancies 
in the practical advice, which was given to the practicians. A 
coherent fundamental unity can be observed in those very 
different answers that were given, because of the common 
methodological approach of scholasticism. So far it is allowed, 
perhaps even necessary, to question not only one author on his 
comments, but to screen the different positions in comparison 
with each other, in order to seek for such common ground. In 
the following paper I want to look for the concept of freedom 
in the scholastic theories of politics, but will try to do this, 
naturally, only in broad outlines.
To begin with I’d like to say that I do not want to dwell on 
those ‘freedoms’ or ‘liberties’ which are mentioned in a huge 
mass of privileges which were given by medieval rulers to their 
subjects well into the modern times, in order to let the receiver 
participate in the decision making of the body politic of their 
time. These privileges were in those times so to speak 
instruments of political participation, but they were connected 
only loosely with that sort of freedom we are looking for. We, 
rather, are looking for the freedom which was sought as a 
fundamental requirement for life and as an universal claim, 
which cannot be thought of in relationship to special rights and
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privileges of certain social groups within the body politic, but 
must be the nucleus, the substance of individuals and their 
self-onsciousness in social life. Our question is : how did the 
medieval (‘scholastic’) theory of politics understand such claims 
ot liberty for individuals and how did political treatises classity 
treedom in their designs?
I will turn first to Thomas Aquinas. Then I’ll give a glance to 
Giles ot Rome(Aegidius Romanus), in order to move on to 
Marsilius ot Padua and William Ockham. I think that in this 
passage through some highlights of late medieval classicists of 
political theory the subjects of our considerations will be 
comprehensive enough to capture a variety of answers which 
are colored differently. It must be clear from the beginning, 
though, that I cannot go into an encyclopedic overview, but can 
only give a brief overview of some important authors, who are 
different enough to give us a balanced answer to our question.
Thomas Aquinas did not give freedom a central place in his 
political writings. Whereas he had without a doubt an 
astonishing architectural imagination, he actually did not grant 
freedom a place of its own in his theory of political rule. We 
should remember that Thomas Aquinas did not write a single 
comprehensive book on political theory as a whole. Rather, he 
communicated his thoughts in scattered remarks. Only once in 
his life did he write a treatise on the subject, entitled “On 
kingship dedicated to the King of Cyprus^e regno ad regem 
Cypri)”. This was probably at the very end of his life (about 
1276), shortly before that great crisis in his life, which caused
him to stop writing a whole series ot treatises. In this manner 
also his sole political treatise remained fragmentary, which was 
obviously not something he planned. Only after the death of 
Thomas, about thirty years after 1274, i.e. about the year 1305, 
Ptolemy of Lucca, a former student of Thomas Aquinas, wrote a 
consecutive part for the treatise, which found its way into the 
later medieval editions of the treatise and is until today often 
combined with Thomas’ text.
Let us consider here only the first authentic part of the text, 
where discussions on specific constitutional questions are 
presented. Today you can still find specialists discussing the 
question of whether this (short) text was a random assemblage 
of different notes by Thomas put together by some ignorant 
person after his death. This idea was published by the 
American scholar Ignatius Theodore Eschmann several times 
and he has found some followers since, but I think this is 
totally wrong. I am convinced that this first part of “On 
Kingship^Ate regno)” is a genuine work by Thomas and has its 
own special worth because it expresses Thomas’ genuine 
thoughts on politics.
Thomas started this “mirror for princes”, writing a special 
treatise in that literary genre which was the main one for political 
treatises in the high and later Middle Ages, the “specula 
principum . He wanted to dedicate the text to the king of Cyprus 
as a helpful guide for the practical good life of a ruler. But 
because it remained unfinished, it probably never reached the royal 
court of Cyprus. Thomas himself wrote in the “proemium' of the
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text that he was willing to present to the royal addressee “a gift 
at once worthy of Your Royal Highness and befitting my 
profession and office”.2) That was without any doubt Thomas’ 
profession as a teacher at a university and his office as a 
theologian. He then begins to develop a theory of kingship and 
rulership, a very ‘modern’ one, fitting for his own time. He was 
one of the first scholastic thinkers to use the then brand new 
Latin translation of the Aristotelian ‘ Politica, which had 
reached Western Europe by only about 1265, at the most ten 
years before Thomas sat down for his own treatise. Thomas 
used this ‘trendy’ scientific method now again as the very first 
author in an unusual way, building with the terms of the 
Aristotelian ‘Politica’ a theory of his own. He did not write an 
explanatory commentary on the new and much awaited text. He 
applied Aristotelian patterns that were conceived by Aristotle (in 
ancient Athens during the fourth century before Christ) now for 
an analysis of his own time, fitting for Italy and Italian 
communities and principalities of the thirteenth century of the 
Christian Era. So his ‘mirror of princes’ is totally different from 
the earlier texts of this name, which were written in the earlier 
13th century. He knew the most important ones of these texts 
certainly well, at least he knew the big compilation of excerpts 
and quotations, which were collected at the Friars Preachers’ 
convent of Saint Jacques in Paris under the leadership of
2) Celsitudini dignum meeque professioni et officio congruum cited here after 
St. Thomas Aquinas: On Kingship to the King of Cyprus, done into English 
by Gerald B. Phelan, revised with introduction and notes by Ignatius 
Theodore Eschmann, O.P.(Toronto 1949), p. 2.
brother Vincentius ot Beauvais about 30 years betore, in the 
forties and fifties of the century, and perhaps " but this is only 
a speculation " he had himself participated in accumulating 
them and heaping them together, when he had been a young 
Dominican student there. But certainly he had seen the huge 
compilation and knew it.
But Thomas wanted to do things differently. He did not want 
to bring that endless material of traditional authorities together 
into a somehow manageable handy package in a sort of 
‘Readers Digest’ of all the important materials on the topic, as 
was done by Vincentius. Instead of this, Thomas wanted to 
provide a real theory of political power, on which an analytic 
and independent judgement on the rulers and their rulership of 
his own days could be based. Admittedly, only the basis of the 
whole project was laid in the first book. The final execution of 
books II to IV is lacking as well as the exemplary treatment of 
specific issues. Therefore, we do not know all the ideas Thomas 
wanted to tell his contemporaries.
Thomas stayed quite monosyllabic on the question of freedom 
as a basic requirement of any political organization: Here he 
looks to Aristotle very closely. Of course, it does not escape 
him that the ancient Greek philosopher had seen in freedom 
the basic requirement of political life in the ancient Greek city 
state, the polis, declaring e.g., that only free men can be 
participants of decisions on the weal and woe of the city state, 
while all others are excluded either for a short time (like 
children who had to wait to become adults) or are excluded
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from any participation (like the strangers and slaves and with 
Aristotle, too, the wives, who were not allowed to have any part 
in political decisions).
Thomas did not specifically cite all these notes, but he takes 
over the Aristotelian pattern, particularly in its fundamental 
considerations for the societal endowment of man as such, 
when he emphasizes that alone the social destiny of man _ who 
is, according to Aristotle, an “animal sociale et politicum’ (i.e. a 
societal and political animal) " cannot be understood properly if 
one does not understand that the “reasonable end” of the 
whole multitude of men must be reached by all. All men are 
reasonable. We understand therefore his argument: “A thing is 
rightly directed when it is led towards a befitting end. Now the 
end which befits a multitude of free men is different from that 
which befits a multitude of slaves, for the free man is one who 
exists for his own sake, while the slave as such exists for the 
sake of another.”3) The “finis conveniens” of a multitude of 
men or of a people can only be a reasonable one (this 
argument of Aristotle is taken over by Thomas). But, and here 
Thomas differs from Aristotle, when he declares that a 
multitude must be ordered by one man, and this is the king, 
towards the convenient end, because otherwise all would seek 
what’s best for themselves, each for his own, and not the 
common good.
This is for Thomas Aquinas the fundamental reason for 
choosing the monarchy as the best form of government. The
3) On Kingship, S. 7
difference between a monarchy and a tyranny is not to be 
sought in the freedom of the people, but in the relation of 
everyone, of the people and of the ruler, to the common good. 
From this definition Thomas deduces immediately what is a correct 
and rational ruler. Ruling has as its goal the bonum commune, the 
common good ot all, not the bonum privatum ot the ruler. “If 
theretore a multitude ot tree men is ordered by the ruler towards 
the common good ot the multitude, that rulership will be right and 
just, as it is suitable for free men. If on the other hand, a 
rulership aims not at the common good of the multitude, but at the 
private good of the ruler, it will be unjust and perverted rulership.” 
A quote from the Bible is for this statement a flank protection: 
“Woe to the shepherds that feed themselves seeking, that is, their 
own interest”(Ezech 34.2).
It is clear, Thomas does not actually establish freedom as a 
condition of good rulership. He is trying rather to establish justice 
as a precondition of a good ruler’s function. Thomas declares that 
a rule will be iniustum et perversum, i.e. unjust and perverted, 
when free men are determined by others (and you can add to this 
the words: like slaves), while the “right and just” rulership is 
leading each free man to his own reasonable goal. It is clear: The 
universal call for freedom here is only the attempt to follow up an 
emphatic demand of justice, and that is linked narrowly with the 
Augustinian tradition, which was for the whole Middle Ages an 
almost self-evident demand. Closely related to this is also the 
juxtaposition that a ‘right and just’ rulership over free men is the 
contrary of an ‘unfair and abusive’ rule, which is qualified from the
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outset as a regimen iniustum- “Such a ruler is a tyrant ... because 
he suppresses (the people) by his power and does not govern with 
justice.”
Here Thomas reinforced the Aristotelian statement, which had 
said that a ruler aiming at his own good was a ‘ despotes 
(despot)’ a man who is ruling over slaves e.g. in his own 
household), whereas the medieval theologian Thomas Aquinas 
already saw this figure as a ‘tyrant’. Thomas does not fail to 
deliver in the course of his treatise a longer discussion on 
prevention and relief from tyrants, an argument which should 
later on win a central role in the design of late medieval 
resistance theory. The explanation by Aristotle that the city 
state of the polis is and should be a community(koinonia) of 
free men is now sharpened and deepened into a 
quasi-metaphysical statement, that only a community of free 
men can be a ‘right’ political association, any other grouping is 
already with Aristotle subject not only to be a ‘constitutional 
degeneration’, but also a ‘perversion(pareM3s/s)’ of monarchy. 
At the same time Thomas goes on and adds here the verdict 
that tyranny would be the worst perversion of the ‘right and 
just’ and therefore ‘monarchy’ would be the ‘best’ constitution.
Certainly, these are rather distinctions in accents, and they 
do not mark heavy differences in argumentation between 
Aristotle and Thomas. The two lines of argument can be 
converted easily into each other. But the stronger connection to 
the ideal of justice, which Thomas Aquinas has made, increases 
the glory of freedom and lets it shine brighter. We need not
consider here the consequences, which follow from this 
discourse later on in the fragmentary remainder of Thomas’ 
treatise On kingship : indeed, freedom plays there a lesser role 
than the tyrant problem. The justification(or rather 
non-justification) of a tyrannicide(the murder of tyrants) in the 
remaining fragment is not entirely clear. But this has not to be 
considered here in connection with Thomas’ use of the concept 
of freedom in politics. Neither will we look at the demarcation 
of responsibilities of regnum and sacerdocium, of King and 
Pope in Thomas’ theory.
The massive and indissoluble nexus of freedom and justice 
which we find in his conception had consequences. This nexus 
laid down by Thomas was further on a solid base for later 
political theories, especially for students of Thomas. For 
instance, let us look at a single example: Ptolemy of Lucca, a 
student of Thomas in Paris and for some years in Italy his 
confessor (sent to him by the Order of Friars Preachers) has 
drawn an unusual consequence from this Aristotelian 
fundament laid by his teacher, which was not common in the 
Middle Ages: he expressly preferred the constitution of a city 
state, i.e. a republican order of the state, to monarchy, which 
was chosen generally by medieval theorists as the ‘best order’. 
This was not too frequently done in the Middle Ages.
But Thomas’ connection between justice and freedom was not 
an automatism. That is proven by a famous text, which was 
written a generation later by Aegidius Romanus, Giles of Rome. 
The book with the title De regimnine principum was later on in
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the Middle ages incredibly successful. We may say that this book 
was the real ‘bestseller’ of all the medieval political treatises. 
Nowadays there are left to us in different European and North 
American libraries nearly 300 manuscripts of this text, in different 
languages, in Latin and in several vernacular translations: 
French, Castilian, English, German, even Hebrew, and some 
others.4) Giles of Rome perhaps had heard lectures by Thomas 
Aquinas at the university of Paris, although he almost certainly 
was not actually one of his closer students - as he was the 
member of another religious order, the Augustinian Hermits, 
whereas Thomas belonged to the Friar Preachers. In his treatise 
Giles recommends to the ‘right’ prince an earnest commitment 
to justice. The treatise uses several chapters to explain this 
demand for justice as the central virtue of the ruler, and Giles 
repeatedly emphasizes that here is the dividing line separating 
kings from hideous tyrants. Tyranny is described at length in 
all its awfulness and insecurity, whereas the liberty of the 
subjects from suppression is not discussed in these chapters 
which have to tell, indeed, something on the virtues of the 
ruler. Only very late, as a (sixth) group of meritorious subjects, 
there are mentioned men who persecute a tyrant, because they 
try to free their homeland from a tyrant’s oppressions. But this
4) A first overview is given by Wilhelm Berges, Die Fürstenspiegel des hohen 
und späten Mittelalters (Leipzig 1938 [Reprinf: Stuttgart 1952]): now look 
especially for the French translations to Noelle-Laetizia Perret, Les 
traductions frangaises du De regimine principum de Gilles de Rome, 
Parcours materiel, cuiturei et intellectuel d’un discours sur l’education 
(Leiden-Boston 2011).
is not written in order to give them a special consideration. 
Generally, the question ot what should be called kingship and 
what tyranny was answered by naming the two criteria we know 
already from Thomas Aquinas: subjectively by the virtue of the 
ruler and objectively by answering the question of whether he 
was serving the common good, or the private good of the ruler. 
The liberty of the subjects might have been implicitly involved 
there or even must have been understood as contained in the 
virtue of the ruler, but as far as I can see, this is nowhere 
explicitly written in Giles book.
Later on in his life, when Giles of Rome wrote his book On the 
ecclesiastical power {De potestate ecclesiastica) at the court of 
pope Boniface VIII about the year 1302, Giles did not waste any 
remark on the freedom of the members of the church under the 
pope whom he saw at its highest hierarchical top. Where he was 
describing the relationship between the pope and temporal rulers, 
Giles said nothing about the freedom of European kings or peoples 
from the demands of the pope (their spiritual leader), that means 
in describing the relationship, which in modern times we would call 
the relations of church and state, he was content to say not a 
single word on freedom. The Latin word liberitree) only appears 
when Giles is ascribing to the pope a libera potestab{i.e. a free 
competence), whereby he could claim that in the last resort always 
all decisions belong to the pope, although they were normally 
assigned to ‘lesser’ authorities. This is exactly the argument Giles 
is producing here _ just as God himself is able to let everything in 
the world go its natural course and let all creatures do their
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normal work regularly, he is also able in some cases casually to
suspend this normal procedure and perform a miracle, which is the
breaking down of normal relations and effects. By such miraculous
effects God shows only his own abilities. He is always the Lord
and this is made clear by these exceptions of the “normal” course
of things. In the same manner the pope is free in making the last
decisions. By doing so he is showing only his own abilities. There
is no word on the freedom of the subjects in this argumentation.
The theory of Giles of Rome shows clearly that the call for
freedom, which was still so present in Thomas Aquinas, was gone
and in its place was a clear and unquestionable assignment of
competences to the ruler, who could hold alone for himself the
right of making decisions in this system.
Later on we meet, however, new reflections, which are in a
certain sense a fresh and new result of Aristotelian theories in
medieval circumstances. I want to show this by approaching
Marsilius of Padua. For Aristotle there was a clear difference
between free men and slaves. The Greek philosopher could
speak even of ‘slaves by nature’(a'oü./o; physei in Greek, or
servi natura in Latin), which meant that there are men who
were condemned by their natural endowment to a servile status,
because they could not rule themselves. I do not want here to
go to the development of commentaries in scholastic
Aristotelianism regarding this special point in detail,5) but it is
5) See especially Christoph Flüeler, Rezeption und Interpretation der 
aristotelischen “Politica ” im späten MitteiaiterfBochumer Studien zur 
Philosophie, 7S//-A(Amsterdam/ Philadelphia, PA 1992)[=Phil. Diss. 
(Freiburg/Schweiz 1989)].
clear that a Christian thinker could not fail to overlook the fact 
that all human beings are redeemed by Christ and therefore 
had a common basic human condition. This gave to the theory 
of slaves and free men a new shift towards an equality of 
rights for all men within a community.
We can see this clearly with the Paduan philosopher and 
physician Marsilius of Padua and his famously weighty book 
Defensor pacis, finished in Paris at the university in summer 
1324, about one generation after Giles had written his texts. 
Certainly, this “Defender of peace”, according already to his 
title, is not a hymn of freedom, but a ‘defense of peace’ within 
the political community. Marsilius is trying hard to reach this 
aim by rejecting the unjustified claims of the Roman bishop and 
pope to make all decisions, not only in spiritual affairs, but 
also in normal political ones. This is not done primarily 
through the evocation of freedom from ecclesiastical patronage, 
but through an ingenious political philosophy of Aristotelian 
design of political decision-making. Marsilus is looking at the 
legislation, because for him the main instrument of order in a 
community is the enactment of a regulation of life by a law 
which is enforced by a coercive command by the lawgiving 
legislator. The only legislator possible must be the one who is 
able to make such laws and give an coercive command to all. This 
one is according to Marsilius alone the community of all citizens 
(or its weightier _ or prevailing " part). This is the nucleus of 
his whole theory. But where do we find freedom in this lawgiving 
complex? The word libertas civium is used, if we believe the
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word index of the modern editions of the book, in just two spots 
in more than 500 pages of Latin text: In Dictio I , cap. 12, when 
he is proving the sole responsibility of all the citizens together for 
the legislation, Marsilius is referring to freedom, using the same 
quotation from Aristotle's Politics, to which also Thomas Aquinas 
had relied (but here Marsilius is going much further into the 
modern direction than Thomas Aquinas). I quote:
“for because ‘the city is a community of free men’, as we read in 
Politics III chapter 4, any and every citizen should be free and not 
suffer the despotism (i.e. the servile dominion) of another. But this 
would not be the case if someone or few of the citizens passed law 
upon the universal body of the citizens on their own authority, for 
in legislating in this way they would be despots over the others. 
And therefore the rest of the citizens (viz. the more extensive part) 
would either take this law badly _ however good it was _ or not 
accept it at all: as all the victims of contempt, they would protest 
against it, and since they had not been involved in its passage they 
would not observe it at all.”6>
I need not emphasize that here the basic Aristotelian text
shines through the lines immediately, and is indeed explicitly
cited. The problem here seems to me to ensure compliance
with the legislation, the expectancy that the regulations shall be
followed up by all. This is here the reason for the argument
that freedom is the presupposition of the political action of
‘legislation’. It remains significant that Marsilius did not put
6) Marsilius of Padua. Defensor pacis. 1.12.6. Cited from The Defender of the 
Peace. Ed. and Trans. Annabel Brett. Cambridge. p. 70.
here (like Thomas) solely ‘tyranny’ in the place ot Aristotelian 
‘despotism’, in order to justify the tight against tyranny. By 
these arguments Marsilius is justifying his statement time and 
again that in all constitutions the actual and rightful legislator 
is always ‘solely{tantummodo)’ the community of citizens who 
participate as voters in state affairs. Only this thesis allows 
Marsilius to make rigid conclusions against the interference of 
the Church and pope into the political affairs of the emperor, 
of the kingdoms of Western Europe and of other principalities 
and cities. This was not found in Aristotle, but is genuine 
Marsilian theory, and I add it was the core of his theory. 
Marsilius had found this argumentation beyond the texts of 
Aristotle, but not without an Aristotelian argument backing it 
up, although Aristotle’s intention had been quite different.
At the same place Marsilius used freedom to support a 
central point of his theory.
“For the greater part of the entire common human sufficiency 
rests in their being rightly established, whereas under iniquitous 
laws there is only intolerable slavery, oppression and misery for the 
citizens, which ultimately results in the dissolution of the polity.”7)
Oppression, servitude and misery apparently derive from the 
adoption of bad laws. But especially in order to avoid such 
sinister effects the political community had been erected. The 
core of polity is safeguarded by rightly established laws. This is
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the Marsilian message to his time. It legislation is done in the 
right way, and that means by all tree men ot the polity, then 
the polity is fortified and even guaranteed. Marsilius is looking 
at the variety of the ‘modes’ of possible constitutions described 
by Aristotle (the monarchy, aristocracy and democracy and 
their flawed transgressions of ‘tyranny, oligocracy, ochlocracy’). 
His result is important for the purposes of locating freedom in 
his context:
“All pricipate is either over willing or unwilling subjects. These 
are the two generic kinds of principate, i.e. tempered <i.e. 
monarchy> and flawed <i.e. tyranny>. -• Each of the said modes 
shares more in the truly royal the more it is over willing subjects 
and in accordance with a law passed for the common advantage of 
these subjects. It savours of tyranny, by contrast, the more it 
departs from these conditions, viz. the consent of those subject and 
a law established to the common advantage.”8)
For Marsilius, in an unfree sysfem, fhe core area of fhe 
polifical consfifufion is perverted, fhe dissolufion of fhe 
Aristotelian politia therefore may follow, or better: must follow. 
There comes to mind the preaching ot ‘Freedom and 
Democracy’ in the second halt ot the 20th century which 
should also foster the prosperity ot entire societies. Marsilius is 
seeing the reason for this connection between freedom and 
prosperity in the fact that the laws enacted in the right manner 
by all can only be effective it and because they have derived
8) Ibid. 1.9.7. Brett, p. 47.
their potentia coactiva{ coercive power) from the potestas 
coactiva{\he coercive competence) of the legislator. That is, they 
derive their binding force from the binding force of the 
compelling legislator.
But if the legislature is " at least ideally " coincident with all 
the citizens, this compelling power is a compelling or coercive 
fovce{potestas coactiva), which is exercised by all of the citizens 
together. Therefore, their force is directed mainly and merely 
against themselves. We remember the free man as causa sui 
with Thomas of Aquinas! When ‘the’ legislator is forcing 
himself, it is not discussed whether there is need of a majority, 
or even a qualified majority or unanimity of the whole? What 
happens to the dissenters? Such questions are not asked, let 
alone be answered in the book, but this form of majoritarian 
tyranny over dissenters is also exerted by the ‘volonte generale 
of Jean Jacques Rousseau three centuries later. In principle, in 
his argumentation, Marsilius is fostering freedom as a 
prerequisite of good government with ideas found outside of the 
Aristotelian context.
Here, we note first the necessary consent of the governed, as 
legislators together with the quasi-objective common good, which 
benefits everyone. This becomes in the Defensor pacis the decisive 
criterion on a sliding scale of possible exacerbation, which 
determines the location of a specific constitution: The more 
consensus there is, the ‘better’ is the Constitution, and vice versa 
in the worst case. In his short summary at the end of the treatise, 
Marsilius underscores once again the importance of freedom: he
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says:
“This treatise will be called The Defender of Peace, because it 
discusses and explains the particular causes by which civil peace or 
tranquility is preserved and exists, and also those through which its 
opposite, strife, arises, is prevented and is removed. For by its 
authority [i.e. the authority of the book] cause and harmony of 
divine and human laws and of coercive principate of any kind [•••] 
can be known. Furthermore, both prince and subject, [•••] can 
understand by this treatise what they must do in order to preserve 
the peace and their own liberty.”9)
Freedom is gaining here almost the same importance as 
peace and tranquility. Liberty and freedom in a definitely
Aristotelian cloth are set beside peace, which Marsilius was 
willing to defend against papal aggression.
Freedom was set in a similar position in the political theory 
of a contemporary writer of Marsilius, who still today is 
considered like him a “classic” medieval theorist of politics. The 
English theologian William Ockham demanded freedom in
politics rather more comprehensively than the Padovan thinker. 
It is certainly much more difficult to explain in a few words 
Ockham’s ideas of freedom than to visit the few places where 
Marsilius is speaking of liberty. Ockham's writings are full with
the pathos of freedom, and this is already the case in his
‘academic’ texts which he had written during his university 
career in Oxford. His theology seems centered in a deep
9) Ibid. III.3. Brett, p.557.
experience of God's free power.10) Other topics ot his theology 
are guiding us into the same direction: for instance, his 
doctrine of grace was sometimes argued in research to be 
Pelagian or at least semi-Pelagian, that means Ockham was 
accused of overemphasizing heavily the natural possibilities of 
men to live on Earth without sin. But Ockham stressed the 
point that God himself wanted his creatures to be free and in 
liberty. We do not have to go into details here, but that is 
certainly in connection to Ockham’s idea that also the creature 
must be able to use its free abilities in freedom against the 
creator. His political theories originated not from an Aristotelian 
program, but in his apology of the Franciscan way of living. 
Ockham wanted to explain against papal decrees that 
Franciscan brethren had the freedom to a voluntary 
renunciation of property and could renounce totally and in free 
decision all property on Earth and could become mendicant by 
sustaining their life without the order of a pope or another 
man in order to follow the example of Christ and his disciples 
and live like the founder of the Franciscan Order, Saint 
Francis, or the apostles.11)
From this starting point Ockham developed a complicated theory
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Franziskanerorden im Konflikt um die Armut”, Gelobte Armut, 
Armutskonzepte der franziskanischen Ordensfamilie zwischen Ideai und 
Wirklichkeit vom Mittelalter bis in die Gegenwart, eds. Hans Dieter 
Heimann, Angelika Hilsebein, Bernd Schmies, Christoph Stiegemann 
(Paderborn 2012), pp. 243-283.
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of political structures, which he explained in voluminous writings. 
All of them are interested in the legal framework of reasonable 
political behavior in his contemporary world by maintaining free 
choice and the voluntary behaviour of men. We cannot give an 
account here of Ockham’s theories in greater detail, but we are 
able to point to his use of freedom and his specific call for free 
men and Christians. The pathos of freedom is already evident in 
his casual remark that the Emperor (and therefore, in Ockham’s 
understanding, the monarchic ruler of the world) can only be 
addressed usefully as the ruler of free people, it one respected his 
dignity and the dignity ot mankind. The ‘dignity ot the human race’ 
demands that the subjects ot the emperor are not treated by the 
emperor as mere slaves, “and therefore this dignity of the human 
race would fall aside, if the Emperor was allowed to treat free 
men in all things like slaves”. This Aristotelian argument still 
sounds very courageous today if we remember the situation in 
which it was spoken: It was formulated in a treatise written at the 
emperor’s court in Munich during the last years of Ockham’s 
life.12) The English protege of the German emperor is daring to 
remind the ruler that he is ruling over free men who are not 
his slaves. That seems to me remarkable, as it does not fit 
totally to contemporary attempts to use Roman legal ideas of 
late antiquity in describing the competence of an medieval 
emperor.
12) III.2 Dialogus 11.20 (fol. 255vb): Dignitati enim humani generis derogaret si 
omnes essent servi imperatoris et ideo derogaretur eidem si imperator in 
omnibus posset tractare liberos sicut servos.
But be that as it may, in his main political work, the huge 
fragmentary ‘Dialogus’, Ockham wanted, as he declared in the 
proemium, to give a summa, a summary of the disputes of his 
time between pope and rulers, or a comprehensive textbook 
(however a new kind of a textbook). Here Ockham explains the 
central claims of the papal court. He had read numerous 
treatises of other authors, as he himself has said there, and 
certainly, too, he knew the Defensor pacis of Marsilius, but he 
wrote a new and fresh overview of possible actions in political 
affairs, discussing arguments for and against political claims of 
both sides of the conflict. He denies again and again the 
assertion that the church, including the pope, had received from 
Christ and God the ‘fullness of power (plenitudo potestatis)’ in 
spiritual and political affairs. And within these discussions he 
presents again a special argument: A citation from the letter of the 
Apostles James and Paul, who asked the Christians to understand 
the Christian religion as a lex libertatis (a law of freedom), and 
more than that, as a lex perfectae libertatis (a law of perfect 
freedom). Ockham cites these words from the Bible to prove the 
absolute inadequacy of the papal claim to the ‘fullness of the 
official competence.’ And Ockham does not forget to make an 
in-depth investigation about what really was meant by such 
‘Christian freedom.’ This is for him a sort of shield against any 
demand for unconditional obedience to pope, clergy and church.
“The evangelical law is a law of liberty, by which Christians 
are torn out of the bondage of the ancient law of Moses in 
order not to be drawn again into bondage.” If the Pope had the
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right to command every Christian by virtue ot his plenitudo 
potestatis, which is not contrary to divine law or the law ot 
nature, then the Christians were not really tree in relation to 
the bondage to the law ot the Old Testament. Ockham says 
expressly: “Then Christian law would be by virtue ot this 
appointment by Christ a law intolerable bondage or slavery.” 
The new covenant ot the New Testament must have been given 
as a law in which there is allocated a tangible, real progress ot 
liberty in relation to the Old Covenant, the Old Testament. 
Ockham is proving in an elaborate manner that this extra freedom, 
this greater freedom, cannot be interpreted away by exegetic 
excuses. He supports this statement with an unusually large 
number of Bible citations and patristic quotations in order to save 
this ‘literal’ understanding of the words of the apostles from any 
comparative volatilization: here was not meant freedom from the 
bands of sin nor only freedom in the spiritual sense. If Christians 
should be subject in worldly affairs to the pope’s decisions, an 
intolerable slavery would follow by necessity, and the Apostolic 
freedom would be left empty. In addition, within Christianity, there 
would inevitably arise “division and discord, wars, feuds, the 
whole Christianity will get in great danger and distress.”13)
I have presented here Ockham's argument in some detail (but 
I could have presented it in even more detail!). I did this
13) III. 1 Dialogus 1.5: ••• si papa uteretur tali potestate privando reges et alios 
Christianos regnis et rebus suis pro sue voluntatis arbitrio et eos 
subiciendo servituti vel operibus servilibus, orirentur scismata et 
dissensiones, bella ac guerre inter Christianos, eciam periculum et 
dispendium tocius Christia nitatis.
deliberately, in order to show how Ockham understood the 
promise ot freedom as a real liberation from ancient bonds. In 
fact, according to his interpretation, the Christians should not only 
get spiritual release as in freedom from the servitude of sin; they 
should enjoy freedom in relation to the ancient state of the Old 
Testament, which they should be able to use in self- determined 
behaviour, independent of the authority of the Church hierarchy, of 
the clergy and the Pope. Applying this demand immediately to the 
relationship between pope and emperor or pope and Christian kings, 
Ockham wrote his Dialogus during the last big struggle between 
these representatives of state and church in the Middle Ages, but 
he analysizes for this endeavor the whole of Christendom in its 
secular political constitution.
But there is more. One question remains unresolved. If we 
identify the Christian law (lex evangeiica) according to this reading 
of the Bible as the ‘law of perfect freedom’ in the realistic sense 
Ockham explained, there remains the question: Is it still possible 
under these conditions to tolerate the restrictions of freedom in 
more limited social relationships? What shall a Christian do with 
his serfs and slaves? Ockham's answer is cautious and not 
revolutionary at all. He insists on a literal understanding of the 
comparative in the apostle’s expressions: The Bible is talking of a 
‘larger’ freedom than was possible under the law of Moses. 
Therefore, besides their freedom in Christ, Christians are allowed 
to have slaves, even if no Christian can become a slave of any 
other man directly by the law of Christ.14)
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The concept of perfection, as Ockham has written, is an 
absolute maximum, which retains a character of absolute 
appeal. In his answer to the question, the Franciscan theologian 
uses this theoretical argument from contemporary physics, 
connecting it to a traditional argument of piety. The Christian 
religion can
“rightly be called a law of perfect liberty, especially in relation to 
the Mosaic law, which had subjugated the believers to many 
sacraments and barely tolerable regulations of ceremonial law. 
Nevertheless, Christian law is not (in any sense) a law of most 
perfect freedom, because always there are degrees of perfection. 
Therefore, Christian law is not to be regarded to be absolutely the 
most perfect of all laws. In this mortal life never there will be an 
absolutely perfect freedom.”15)
We should nof oversfress here the almosf emphafic 
resignafion in which Ockham explains fhaf no ideal is feasible 
in fhis earthly life. We also do not need to trace here in detail 
the new physical theories of natural philosophy which were 
developed at Oxford University in the early 14th century, the
Christianos ab omni servitute, sed quia non premit Christianos tanta 
servitute quanta pressi fuere Iudei; et ideo licet regibus et aliis Christianis 
servos habere, licet per legem Christianam nullus Christianus fiat servus 
cuiuscumque.
15) III. 1 Dialogus 1.7: Merito debet dici lex perfecte libertatis, presertim 
respectu legis Mosaice, que quampluribus sacramentis et ceremoniis vix 
portabilibus subiectos involvit. Non [165] tamen dicitur lex perfectissime 
libertatis. In perfeccione enim sunt gradus, quia non omne perfectum est 
perfectissimum reputandum. Perfectissima autem libertas in hac vita 
mortali nequaquam habebitur.
time when Ockham studied there, and which he might have 
remembered now in Munich when he wrote down the last part 
ot the Dialogus. Oxford physicists had sought to conceptualize a 
new understanding of dynamics by calculation of different levels 
of intensity and thus they prepared the new dynamics of early 
modern science. This part of the history of scientific research 
of natural phenomena is not to followed up here. But Ockham 
here was content putting off absolute expectations until the 
coming of the kingdom of God, while preserving his hope for 
an absolute freedom without any reduction for a future to
come. The tension between the ‘already there’ of perfect liberty 
and the ‘not yet’ of a most perfect freedom remains with him, I 
think, as a genuine Christian eschatological tension. We should 
not consider that as a pious modesty, but we should sense here 
the desire for freedom which is contained in the theory, as the 
dawn of modern and more democratic ideas in political 
thinking.
We have visited in a very restricted tour some positions of
scholastic political theory, regarding problems of
self-determined freedom. This is still today a necessary 
prerequisite for any democratic constitution of the modern
state. In the middle ages this was far away from any chance of 
practical realization. It was not even thinkable in a consistent 
manner in the early middle ages. In late medieval times, the 
reception of Aristotle’s political theory could be, as we have 
seen, the point of departure for several expeditions into this 
until then mainly unexplored terrain. We therefore have found
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ideas of universal freedom of men in our examination of 
political theorists. We met those ideas in no less than three 
major designs of political theory with authors who are 
considered to be so to speak classics of medieval political 
thought: Thomas Aquinas, Marsilius of Padua, and William 
Ockham. We also have caught some of the differences that 
distinguish their individual positions. Medieval political thought 
did not form a single unity ot ideas, but existed as a discourse 
which is worthwhile decoding. In so tar we have reached, as I 
think and as I hope to have been able to explain, a good deal 
ot the prehistory of modern democratic freedom within 
medieval thought.
(Juergen.Miethke@zegk.uni-heidelberg.de/ Heidelberg University)
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